POLITICAL ECONOMY

IN THE CAROLINAS

WHAT DO THE RESULTS OF THE 2016 ELECTION TELL US ABOUT BIAS RESPONSE TEAMS?

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We study the relationship between the existence of university bias response teams (BRTs) and the results of the 2016 US elections. BRTs encourage students and employees to report alleged instances of bias. Previous research in this area tends to study the legality of specific incidents, their pervasiveness, their history, or whether they are justified. See, for example, First Amendment Center (2017) or Miller et al. (2018a,b). Our study is the first to explore the relation between electoral outcomes and BRTs in a quantitative framework.

Among the most critical claims of BRTs' opponents is that they chill academic freedom, which has been fundamental to the scholarly mission of universities since at least the inception of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP, 1915). First Amendment and due process protections are also in conflict with speech codes and BRTs (Fraleigh, 1995).

Such reports are often, and perhaps usually, anonymous, and they typically lead to extralegal tribunals with few due process protections for

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Classical Liberals
THE CAROLINAS

the accused. According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), "Bias Response Teams often submit speech to the review of police and campus conduct administrators, who launch an 'investigation' or bring 'charges' against the 'respondent,' who may be summoned for a 'hearing' and found 'guilty' or be provided with an 'educational' reprimand—or, in the case of Longwood University, 'education sanctions.'"

BRTs have existed for at least two decades.[1] According to *Inside Higher Ed* (2016), The Ohio State University formed its BRT in 1996. Arguments for and against BRTs are well known. For example, Leef (2017) claims that students today, instead of coming face to face with disagreeable statements, are avoiding opinions different from their own or even trying to silence those with different beliefs, arguments, or opinions than their own. Leef believes that BRTs are fostering this suppression of free speech. Setting up a BRT at a school establishes an official process for soliciting reports of alleged bias incidents on campus. The BRT responds to these complaints. Sometimes, though, the complaints from students, faculty, or staff concern speech that is protected under the First Amendment. According to Leef, BRTs encourage young American students to complain about opposing views rather than arguing against them, something that falls under the category of educational malpractice.

Another example of an argument against BRTs is Kupfer's (2016) essay that describes BRTs as "an authoritarian tool with a stupid name." He points out that BRTs introduce an unbalanced power dynamic into the investigation of alleged bias. University or college administrators are often in charge of BRTs at campuses across the nation. Administrators investigate incidents and share their findings or concerns with the party who allegedly started the incident. School administrators obviously hold power over both students and faculty, which "crosses the line," according to Kupfer. When an authority figure asks a professor or student to do something, is it really a request? Or is it an implicit threat? For example, the executive summary of FIRE's *Bias Response Team Report 2017* states:

> FIRE found that some 92.4% of the 449 schools surveyed for our annual speech code report maintain policies that either clearly and substantially restrict speech, or can otherwise be interpreted to punish protected speech. At such schools, a Bias Response Team's practice of broadly defining and identifying "bias" may expose a wide range of protected speech to punishment. Even where schools purport only to provide "education" to the offending speaker, instead of formal punitive sanctions (such as suspension or expulsion), this response is often undertaken by student conduct administrators, not educators, and more closely resembles a reprimand.

Arguments in favor of BRTs tend to focus on issues such as supporting diversity, enhancing the culture of an institution, or providing resources to alleged victims of bias. Given that Portland State University (2018) defines bias in part as a "state of mind," the

1. See University of Tennessee (2018) or Portland State University (2018) for examples of BRT websites. Note that bias response teams are sometimes called bias assessment and response teams, or BARTs.

goal of eradicating bias comes close to an attempt to ban thoughts.

Portland State's BRT website says that a bias incident is similar to a hate crime but "may not rise to the level of a crime."[2] However, while hate crimes can be committed against anyone, Portland State University's website says that bias incidents solely concern protected classes. Others, such as Fraleigh (1995), have argued that speech codes banning "intentional infliction of emotional distress" are both desirable and likely able to withstand First Amendment challenges.[3]

Miller et al. (2018) report that many university administrators support BRTs because they allow administrators to take action against what would otherwise be considered free speech under the First Amendment. They interviewed twenty-one administrators at nineteen institutions and found general agreement among those interviewed that BRTs could help to balance free speech with other interests.

Why might election results be related to the existence of BRTs? Without a demand for BRTs, the supply of them would be at or near zero. Which groups demand a BRT? The conflict between BRTs and the First Amendment suggests that those who support BRTs tend to discount the First Amendment. Because awareness of and support for the First Amendment differ between Republicans and Democrats (Ekins, 2017), we think it reasonable to conjecture that Democrats discount arguments against BRTs and tend to impose them more than Republicans. Given Soffen's (2014) work, we also know that university students, faculty, and administrators tend to support Democrats more than the general public.[4] Thus, university administrators, faculty, and students are the likely drivers of BRT demand. To the extent these individuals live near the university, voters near the university tend to favor Democrats. To the extent that these individuals are influenced by their state's legislature and general voting population, universities in jurisdictions with more Democrats are more inclined to establish BRTs.[5]

These arguments suggest that BRTs are more common in states in which residents voted for Democratic candidates and less common if residents voted for Republican candidates. We use national data and state-level data to test this. At the national level, we use Republican presidential vote share, Republican US Senate vote share (if at least one senator ran for election in that state), Republican House vote share, and Republican vote share for the representative of the university's congressional district as

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2. According to Portland State's website, "The goals of the BRT are:
   - To develop educational and outreach programs from the data collected from bias reports;
   - To provide support and resources to those impacted by bias incidents;
   - To increase opportunities for communication and restorative justice for students, staff, and faculty; and
   - To address incidents and trends identified through the reports utilizing resources such as trainings, communications, individual redress, and other means, that will improve the campus climate."
3. More than twenty-five years later, the legality of BRTs remains in dispute (as seen in the 2021 case *Speech First, Inc. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*).
4. Langbert, Quain, and Klein (2016) report that "Democratic-to-Republican [faculty] ratios are even higher than we had thought (particularly in Economics and in History), and that an awful lot of departments have zero Republicans." They suggest that the ratio is at least ten to one. Although this does not speak directly to the question of the entire university's voting patterns, it certainly biases a university community's voting patterns in favor of Democrats.
5. We thank an anonymous referee for clarifying this line of reasoning.

explanatory variables. We use similar data at the state level, substituting Republican gubernatorial data for presidential vote share, and we explore whether the Carolinas behaved differently from other states.

We also control for whether the university is public or private. According to the FIRE (2017) report, "Institutions have been quick to delete or hide once-public websites documenting bias incidents following public criticism." This suggests that public opinion matters to administrators. If so, and if such public opinion affects elections, then we should find a relationship between elections and the existence of BRTs. For example, if elected officials respond to voters' preferences, then they may increase or decrease public institutions' budgets depending on the direction of voters' wishes. Private institutions are probably more insulated from this effect.

I. DATA

FIRE provided our data on BRTs. Voting totals are from sources cited in Wasserman (2017). These include vote totals for president, US senators, US representatives, governors, state senators, and state representatives.

We ignore votes cast for candidates who are not members of the Republican or Democratic Party for two reasons. First, they represent only small portions of the total vote. According to Wasserman (2017), only 5.7 percent of popular votes were cast for third-party candidates in the 2016 presidential election. Second, the net effect of these votes is almost surely small, because some third-party votes would otherwise have been cast for Republicans and others for Democrats (or not at all); there is no reason to assume that these votes are biased toward one political party. Tau (2016) presents evidence supporting this reasoning.

II. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1NS contains sample statistics for key variables at the national and state levels.[6] These variables include a binary variable for whether a university has a BRT, the Republican vote share for the presidential election in a given university's state (*R Pres*), the Republican vote share for the Senate election (if there was an election) in a given university's state (*R Senate*), the Republican vote share for the House of Representatives election in a given university's state (*R House*), the Republican vote share for the House election in a given university's district (*R Local*), the Republican vote share for the gubernatorial election (if there was an election) in a given university's state (*R Guber*), the Republican vote share for the state-senate election (if there was an election) in a given university's state (*R State Senate*), the Republican vote share for the state-house election in a given university's state (*R State House*), and the percentage of degree-granting institutions in a given state that have BRTs (BRT%).

The six columns in table 1NS are the variable name, the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum value, and the maximum value. Note the number of observations, N. Our data cover the 130 schools with Division I Football

6. Throughout this paper, we append the letter N to the table number if it contains national data; S if state data; and C if data from the Carolinas.

7. These are universities and colleges that are eligible to compete for invitations to the highest-level bowl games.

Bowl Subdivision teams.[7] We selected these institutions because we wanted a sample of schools that most people would recognize and because of limited data availability (mainly the data on congressional-district vote share). The sample includes most major private institutions, such as Stanford, and major public universities, such as The Ohio State University. It also includes smaller institutions, such as Rice University (private) and Troy University (public), and the three major US military academies.

Of the 130 universities in the sample, exactly half have BRTs. Because some states have more than one university that fields a Division I team, the state vote share can appear more than once. For example, both the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University are in the sample, so the Republican presidential share for Texas counts once for each. In fact, Texas fields twelve Division I teams, so it counts for 12 of the 130 observations. For convenience, we sometimes refer to these as "state-university" observations and we refer to averages using these 130 observations as "state-university weighted averages."

According to the official 2016 presidential general election results, published by the Federal Election Commission (2017), Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton received 65,853,516 popular votes, or 48.18 percent of the total votes cast, while Republican candidate Donald J. Trump received 62,984,825 popular votes, or 46.09 percent. This means that the Republican presidential vote share of the two major parties was 48.89 percent. Table 1NS shows that in our sample, though, the state-university weighted average of vote shares tilts Republican. Part of this can be traced to the fact that nine states have no Division I football programs and therefore do not appear in the totals; and the Republican presidential candidate won only four of them. This probably excludes more Democratic votes than Republican votes. More important, however, is that some populous states, such as New York, are home to relatively few teams—in New York's case, only three. The Republican presidential candidate's vote share was just over 38 percent in New York, but because only three universities from New York field Division I teams, the state's influence in our data set is small relative to the total number of votes cast by New York residents.

We have only ninety-three Senate observations, because not all Senate seats were contested in 2016. The minimum vote share of zero is in California, which uses a top-two primary system, and neither of the top two candidates was a Republican. Thus, the Republican share in California's general election was zero. Overall, the Republican share of the Senate vote was 51.11 percent.

Republicans received zero votes in the Vermont congressional election, but because no Division I programs hail from Vermont, the minimum vote share that enters the sample is from Massachusetts, home of Boston College and the University of Massachusetts. The Republican share of these 130 state-university observations averaged 55.47 percent. The 130 local congressional districts that contained universities in our sample tilted Republican by a smaller margin: Republicans captured an average of 52.01 percent of the two-party congressional vote in these districts. This is consistent with Soffen

(2014).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results for state-level data are very similar to the national data. Republican vote share is between 51 and 56 percent for the executive branch and both chambers of the legislative branch both nationally and at the state level.

The dependent variable in our regressions is the percentage of universities with BRTs relative to the total number of universities in each state. We believe that FIRE's (2017) list of schools with BRTs is the most comprehensive available, so we used that for the numerator. To obtain the denominator, we used state-level data from the U.S. Department of Education (2017). We counted only institutions that offered at least a two-year degree, which primarily excludes trade schools.

Because the denominator of the dependent variable includes schools without Division I football programs, the average percentage of institutions with BRTs in each state is far lower than the 50 percent observed among Division I programs. The equally weighted average of the fifty states is just 4.37 percent. Several states had no universities with BRTs. Rhode Island, at 15.79 percent, recorded the highest percentage. Rhode Island had no Division I teams. Among the forty-one states that did, Wisconsin had the highest percentage, at 13.54 percent.

III. T-TESTS

Table 1C presents similar statistics for North and South Carolina. Sample sizes are small, because only ten Division I programs call the Carolinas home. The numbers are quite similar to the national numbers (t-tests presented below). Most notably, in the gubernatorial election and the district housing the school, Republican shares were under 50 percent.

Table 2NS reports t-tests of the variables *R Pres*, *R Senate*, *R House*, *R Local*, *R Guber*, *R State Senate*, and *R State House* for universities with and without BRTs. For all six variables, the Republican vote share is higher for schools that do not have BRTs. Only the House share is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, although the p-value for *R Pres* just misses the cutoff, at 6.3 percent. The evidence suggests that the Republican vote share is negatively correlated with BRTs.

The economic significance of the differences in vote shares is debatable. The largest is for the House, for which the difference is 4.25 percentage points. The smallest is for the House seat of the university's district. In that case, the difference is only 0.78 percentage points. That this is the smallest of the six differences is no surprise. University students and employees tend to vote Democratic more than the general population, and to the extent that these people live near campus, those districts lean Democratic more than the rest of the state. We do not tabulate t-statistics for the Carolinas. None was statistically significant, which is unsurprising given that we have only ten observations.

Table 3 reports t-tests testing whether the means for the institutions in the Carolinas differ from those of the institutions in the other forty-eight states. Probably in large part because of the limited number of institutions in the Carolinas, the answer is generally no. Two exceptions are worth noting. First, the percentage of schools with BRTs is over twice as large in the Carolinas as it is in other states, and this stands as the only statistically reliable

difference. The other notable difference is the proportion of BRTs among Division I schools. In the Carolinas, the figure is 70 percent. In other states, it is just 48.3 percent. However, this difference is statistically insignificant.

IV. FREE SPEECH ZONES

Some universities have limited speech to small or remote areas of campus, sometimes called free speech zones. State lawmakers have responded in some jurisdictions by banning these zones, thereby restoring the right to speak freely throughout the campus.[8] This is not, strictly speaking, an election result, and none of the bans was implemented on November 8, which is the date that votes were cast in the presidential and congressional elections in 2016. However, to the extent that the imposition of free speech zones and BRTs is positively correlated, which seems reasonable, then we can use bans on free speech zones to gauge whether state legislatures push back against these BRTs. Michigan's Republican state representative Jim Runestad, for example, introduced Joint Resolution P, which would amend the state's constitution to give legislatures more authority to protect free speech. See also Gockowski (2017) for information about similar legislation.

Eight states had banned free speech zones by the year of the FIRE (2017) report. These are Arizona (imposed in 2017), Colorado (2017), Kentucky (2017), Missouri (2015), North Carolina (2017), Tennessee (2017), Utah (2017), and Virginia (2017). Florida imposed a ban in 2018, after the date of the FIRE (2017) report, so we do not consider it as having a ban.[9]

Table 4 presents the results of t-tests comparing the percentages of universities that have BRTs in states that have banned free speech zones and in those that have not. A total of 26 universities were in states that had banned free speech zones, leaving 104 in states that had not. Note that this test is state-university weighted. For example, Alabama, which has five Division I programs, counts five times in this calculation, whereas Alaska, which has no universities with Division I teams, does not enter at all.

Does the percentage of universities with BRTs differ if a university's state has banned free speech zones? The answer is yes. The state-weighted average percentage of BRTs in states that have banned free speech zones is 4.73 percent. In states that have not, it is 3.33 percent (t-ratio −2.88). Of course, a state can ban these restrictions on free speech without making any statement about BRTs. But one plausible interpretation is that if the number of free speech abuses reaches some threshold level, then state legislatures push back.

V. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

For all fifty states, we use national data and estimate the following equation:

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Pres_j + ß_1 * R\ Senate_j + ß_2 * R\ House_j + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

The variables are defined as follows:

***BRT%$_j$*:** Number of degree-granting institutions with BRTs in state j / number of

8. The legality of free speech zones is problematic, at best, and one could argue that bans on such zones technically cannot "restore" a right that could not have been taken away in the first place. Discussing the constitutionality of free speech zones is beyond the scope of this paper, so for convenience we simply write that the right to speak freely is "restored" by the authorities who ban free speech zones.
9. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that administrators in Florida might have changed their behavior in anticipation of such a ban in the coming year. We did not include Florida, because we are studying institutions with a ban already in place.

institutions in state j, as a percent

***R Pres$_j$*:** Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, Trump's share of Republican + Democratic share in Tennessee for the University of Tennessee), expressed in percent

***R Senate$_j$*:** Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in the university's state, expressed in percent

***R House$_j$*:** Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in the university's state, expressed in percent

If institutions in states that voted Republican in 2016 tend to have fewer BRTs, then the estimated coefficients ß$_0$, ß$_2$, and ß$_4$ will be negative.

Because some states did not have a Senate election in 2016, the sample of states is fewer than fifty for equation (1). Therefore, we also estimate equation (2):

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Pres_j + ß_1 * R\ Senate_j + ß_2 * R\ House_j + \varepsilon_j \quad (2)$$

Interpretations of these estimated coefficients are the same as for equation (1).

Equations (1) and (2) tell us about the relationship between the proportion of a state's institutions that have BRTs and the state's election results. They are silent about individual institutions. Therefore, for each university, we estimate the logit regression in equation (3):

$$BRT_i = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Pres_i + ß_1 * R\ Senate_i + ß_2 * R\ House_i + ß_3 * Private + ß_4 * R\ Local_i + \varepsilon i \quad (3)$$

Here,

BRT$_i$ = 1 if university *i* has a BRT and 0 otherwise;

Private$_i$ = 1 if university *i* is private and 0 if public;

R Local$_i$ = Republican share of votes in the congressional district of university *i*, expressed in percent.

Other variables are defined as previously. (The exception is a notation change for consistency. In equations (1) and (2) we refer to state *j*. Here, because university *i* is in that state, we refer to the state as *i*.)

If private institutions are more likely to have BRTs, perhaps because they are more insulated from political opposition to BRTs, then the estimate of ß$_3$ is positive. If Republican voters tend to elect congressional representatives who oppose BRTs and this reduces the likelihood that a local institution has a BRT, then the estimate of ß$_4$ is negative.

Multicollinearity could be a factor in these regressions. To check for this, we computed variance inflation factors (VIF). Only one is problematic: for presidential vote share in the regression with Senate and House variables, the VIF is 10.09, just over the standard (if informal) value of 10 that signals a problem. For Senate share, the VIF is 4.89, and for House share, it is 5.19. Values for state-level variables are even lower. The largest VIF in any regression is 3.24. Also important, multicollinearity is a question of power. Coefficients are still unbiased and consistent, and goodness-of-fit statistics are unaffected. Multicollinearity is part of the reason we include different specifications, and we also use regressions with a single variable, which eliminates the problem entirely.[10]

VI. REGRESSION RESULTS

Table 5N presents the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) as well as model 3, which drops the insignificant *R Pres* variable.

The only significant independent variable in model 1 is *R House*, which is negative. *R Pres* is insignificantly positive, and *R Senate* is insignificantly negative. In model 2, which drops *R Senate* to pick up an additional sixteen observations, nothing is statistically significant, but the estimated coefficients on both *R Pres* and *R House* are negative. The results are statistically insignificant, but the signs are consistent with the interpretation that right-leaning jurisdictions tend to have fewer BRTs.

The low explanatory power of our model could be due to missing variables. We are interested in the effects of election results on BRTs, so we use those results as explanatory variables, but future research could incorporate party control of university governing boards, such as university administration or the faculty senate. Poorly funded institutions may lack the resources to impose and support BRTs, and institutions with relatively homogeneous ethnic or religious groups, such as Historically Black Colleges and Universities or Christian institutions, may have different tendencies when it comes to supporting BRTs than their more diverse counterparts. Schools with higher percentages of liberal arts majors might have different propensities to institute BRTs. University endowments may also insulate institutions from criticism.[11]

Model 3 also drops the statistically insignificant *R Pres*. This model fits the data better than model 1 or model 2. The adjusted *R*-square is 0.12, compared with just 0.005 and 0.105 for the others. The estimate of α_R, the coefficient on *R House*, is −0.084. This is almost exactly the same as in model 1, but the precision of the estimate is higher. This is partly because the sample is larger (because *R Senate* is excluded), and partly because we eliminated the noise of the insignificant variables. Because of the decreased standard error, the magnitude of the t-ratio rises to −2.76 from −2.34.

The economic significance of the estimate, −0.084, is very low. A 1 percentage-point increase in *R House* for a state is associated with just a 0.084 percentage-point decline in the proportion of universities with BRTs in a state. Taken at face value, this is negligible. However, remember from table 1NS that the range of the dependent variable is only 15.79 percentage points. This means that we could make this statement about the economic significance of *R House*: the difference between a 45 percent share and a 55 percent share is associated with a decrease in the proportion of universities with BRTs within that state of about 5.32 percent of the entire range of proportions across the fifty states. Phrased that way, the coefficient estimate seems to carry more weight.

VII. LOGIT-REGRESSION RESULTS

Results using state-level data (table 5S) tell much the same story. In model 1, limited to just twelve observations for governor, no variables are significant. The sign of the estimate for Republican share of the gubernatorial election is positive, which does run counter to the general story that higher Republican vote shares are associated with fewer BRTs, but the estimated coefficient on the Republican share of the state-senate elections is negative and slightly larger in magnitude. In model 2, which drops the

10. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.

insignificant gubernatorial variable to increase the sample size, no variables are significant. Model 3 drops the Republican state-senate share. In this model, the Republican state-house vote share is significantly negative at the 10 percent level, with a t-ratio of −1.76. This is consistent with other evidence that higher Republican vote shares tend to be associated with fewer BRTs.

Can we say anything about the Carolinas? In fact, we can. Table 5NC (viz., Table 5, for National data from the Carolinas) adds a binary variable (*NCSC*) that equals 1 if the university is in either North Carolina or South Carolina to the regressions using federal data. The two most obvious results are, first, that *NCSC* is significantly positive, implying that institutions located in either North Carolina or South Carolina are more likely to have BRTs. The second point is that the other coefficients and *t*-ratios are remarkably similar. Adding *NCSC* has almost no effect on them. At the state level (table 5SC), the results are almost the same: the executive-branch and senate-election coefficients are statistically insignificant, the estimated *R House* coefficient is significantly negative in model 3, and the estimated coefficient on *NCSC* is significantly positive.

Why do the Carolinas behave differently? The answer probably traces to sample size. There are, after all, only two Carolinas, with just ten Division I institutions. In North Carolina, five of seven institutions have BRTs; and two of three institutions have them in South Carolina. Given that only half of the Division I institutions in the entire sample have BRTs, a statistically significant coefficient on the variable controlling for the Carolinas is unsurprising.

Table 6N presents the results of a logit regression estimating equation (3) using national data on the 130 Division I institutions and the results of models that use a subset of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable equals 1 if a university has a BRT and 0 if it does not. Model 4 has no explanatory power. Neither does model 5, which drops Senate vote totals, expanding the sample to include all 130 institutions.

Model 6 drops presidential vote share and the Private binary variable. *R House* is statistically significant at the 5 percent critical value, and again the relationship is negative.

Model 7 excludes the insignificant Republican state-house share. The result is that the effect of the excluded variable loads on the state-level variable, *R House*. The sum of the coefficient estimates of these two variables in model 6 is −0.032. The estimate of the coefficient in model 7, which excludes the local-district vote share, is −0.031. This is consistent with the story the data seem to tell: higher Republican vote shares are weakly associated with lower incidence of BRTs.

The Republican House share for the congressional district of the university is never significant. Two factors probably account for this. First, for states such as Wyoming, the entire state is the district, so *R House* equals *R Local*. Second, congressional districts are irregularly shaped and encompass broadly divergent social and economic areas. Although one could reasonably expect districts containing universities to lean Democratic—and they do, relative to the entire state—portions of the district outside the university area dilute the universities' influence on vote

11. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.

shares for that district. The result is that the political leanings of university congressional districts, presumably reflected in their choice of congressional representative, do not add explanatory power beyond the state-level vote share.

Logit results using state-level data are uninformative. Models including a variable to control for private institutions have nothing close to statistical significance, and models analogous to table 6N using gubernatorial, state-senate, and state-house variables are no better. Adding the binary variable *NCSC* makes no difference. Therefore, we do not report these results in tabular form.

We also estimated regressions using terms interacting Private with other variables at both the federal and state levels. None of these terms had significant coefficients, and nothing substantive changed for the other variables.[12]

VIII. CONCLUSION

We studied the relationship between the existence of university BRTs and the results of the 2016 US elections. Previous research in this area tends to study qualitative questions, such as the legality of specific incidents or whether they are justified. To the extent researchers have conducted quantitative work, it tends to be descriptive, chronicling BRTs' pervasiveness or legality. Our paper is the first to explore the relation between electoral outcomes and BRTs in a quantitative framework. Because BRTs have been found to violate First Amendment rights, and because Republicans and Democrats have different views of the First Amendment, we asked whether the existence of BRTs depends on election results for a jurisdiction. Using national data, we found that an increase in Republican House vote share is associated with a small decrease in the frequency of BRTs, but presidential vote shares, Senate vote shares, and the vote shares in the House district of the university are unrelated to the frequency of BRTs. Using state-level data, the result is weaker but still holds.

t-tests show that the percentage of schools with BRTs is much higher in the Carolinas than in the other forty-eight states, and the difference is statistically significant. Regression tests are consistent with this: a binary variable for the Carolinas is positive and statistically significant in all regressions using both state and federal data. The exception is logit regression, which has no explanatory power using state-level data.

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Table 1NS: Sample Statistics

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	MINUMUM	MAXIMUM
BRT	130	0.500	0.502	0	1.00
R Pres	130	53.09	9.65	32.56	75.71
R Senate	93	51.11	17.99	0	73.38
R House	130	55.47	12.02	16.14	87.23
R Local	130	52.01	26.14	0	100.0
R Guber	21	52.54	7.80	45.61	70.96
R State Senate	105	54.33	11.07	21.92	76.71
R State House	110	55.59	8.50	32.61	71.40
BRT%	50	4.37	3.53	0	15.79

Data are for the 130 Division I Football Bowl Subdivision programs. Of the 130, a total of 110 are public, 17 are private, and 3 are military academies. The complete list is from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NCAA_Division_I_FBS_football_programs (accessed February 16, 2018). Excluding the 3 military academies, 56 public institutions had BRTs and 54 did not. Nine private institutions had BRTs, and 8 did not.

Nine states (Alaska, Delaware, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont) have no university with a Division I Football Bowl Subdivision program.

BRT_i: = 1 if university i in that district has a BRT; 0 otherwise

$R\ Pres_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in university i's state (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals Trump's share of the Republican + Democratic vote in Tennessee), expressed in percent

$R\ Senate_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in university i's state, expressed in percent

$R\ House_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university i's state, expressed in percent

$R\ Local_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) in the election for the congressional representative for university i's congressional district, expressed in percent

R Guber$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

R State Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the state-senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R State House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all state-house elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

BRT%$_i$: Number of Division I institutions in state *i* that have BRTs/number of degree-granting institutions in state *i*, expressed in percent

Table 1C: Sample Statistics for the Carolinas

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	MINUMUM	MAXIMUM
BRT	10	0.700	0.483	0	1.00
R Pres	10	53.57	2.68	51.90	57.46
R Senate	10	55.71	4.36	51.90	62.04
R House	10	55.27	3.15	53.32	59.83
R Local	10	43.49	17.05	28.26	72.91
R Guber	7	49.95	0	49.95	49.95
R State Senate	10	55.79	9.76	49.73	69.93
R State House	10	58.79	3.74	56.47	64.21
BRT%	10	7.27	1.18	5.56	8.00

Data are for the ten Division I Football Bowl Subdivision programs in North and South Carolina.

BRT$_i$: = 1 if university *i* in that district has a BRT; 0 otherwise

R Pres$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in university *i*'s state (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals Trump's share of the Republican + Democratic vote in Tennessee), expressed in percent

R Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R Local$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) in the election for the congressional representative for university *i*'s congressional district, expressed in percent

R Guber$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

R State Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the state-senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R State House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all state-house elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

BRT%$_i$: Number of Division I institutions in state *i* that have BRTs/number of degree-granting institutions in state *i*, expressed in percent

Table 2NS: *t*-tests: Do Vote Shares Differ if a University has a BRT?

VARIABLE	MEAN IF BRT (N)	MEAN IF NO BRT (N)	T-RATIO (P-VALUE)
R Pres	51.52 (65)	54.66 (65)	1.88 (0.063)*
R Senate	50.16 (48)	52.12 (45)	0.52 (0.60)
R House	53.35 (65)	57.60 (65)	2.04** (0.04)
R Local	51.61 (65)	52.39 (65)	0.17 (0.865)
R Guber	51.67 (13)	53.96 (8)	0.64 (0.53)
R State Senate	53.70 (55)	55.02 (50)	0.61 (0.54)
R State House	54.63 (57)	56.62 (53)	1.23 (0.22)

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%

R Pres$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in university *i*'s state (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals Trump's share of the Republican + Democratic vote in Tennessee), expressed in percent

R Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R Local$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) in the election for the congressional representative for university *i*'s congressional district, expressed in percent

R Guber$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

R State Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the state-senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R State House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all state-house elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

Table 3 *t*-tests: Do Vote Shares Differ between the Carolinas and Other States?

VARIABLE	MEAN IF CAROLINA (N)	MEAN IF NOT CAROLINA (N)	T-RATIO (P-VALUE)
BRT	0.700 (10)	0.483 (120)	-1.32 (0.191)
R Pres	53.57 (10)	53.05 (120)	-0.16 (0.087)
R Senate	55.71 (10)	50.55 (83)	-0.86 (0.39)
R House	55.27 (10)	55.49 (120)	0.05 (0.97)
R Local	43.49 (10)	52.71 (120)	1.07 (0.29)
R Guber	49.95 (7)	53.84 (12)	1.08 (0.29)
R State Senate	55.79 (10)	54.18 (93)	-0.44 (0.66)
R State House	58.78 (10)	55.27 (98)	-1.25 (0.21)
BRT%	7.27 (10)	3.31 (120)	-5.96 (<0.0001)**

BRT$_i$: = 1 if university *i* in that district has a BRT; 0 otherwise

R Pres$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in university *i*'s state (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals Trump's share of the Republican + Democratic vote in Tennessee), expressed in percent

R Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate

election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R Local$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) in the election for the congressional representative for university *i*'s congressional district, expressed in percent

R Guber$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

R State Senate$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the state-senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R State House$_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all state-house elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

BRT%$_i$: Number of Division I institutions in state *i* that have BRTs/number of degree-granting institutions in state *i*, expressed in percent

Table 4 *t*-tests: Do the Percentage of Universities with BRTs Differ if a University's State has Banned Free Speech Zones?

VARIABLE	MEAN IF BANNED (N)	MEAN IF NOT BANNED (N)	T-RATIO (P-VALUE)
BRT%	4.73 (26)	3.33 (104)	-2.88 (0.005)**

**significant at 5%

BRT%$_i$: Number of degree-granting institutions with BRTs in state *i*/number of institutions in state *i*, expressed in percent

Eight states had banned free-speech zones by the year of the FIRE report (2017). These are Arizona (imposed in 2017), Colorado (2017), Kentucky (2017), Missouri (2015), North Carolina (2017), Tennessee (2017), Utah (2017), and Virginia (2017). Florida imposed a ban in 2018, after the date of the FIRE (2017) report, so we do not consider it as having a ban.

Table 5N: Regression Analysis

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Pres_j + ß_1 * R\ Senate_j + ß_2 * R\ House_j + \varepsilon_j \qquad (1)$$

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Constant	5.54 (2.29)**	9.60 (3.94)**	8.82 (4.71)**
R Pres	0.097 (1.21)	-0.039 (-0.66)	
R Senate	-0.376 (-0.76)		
R House	-0.830 (-2.34)**	-0.059 (-1.50)	-0.084 (-2.76)**
Observations	34	50	50
Adj. R-Square	0.005	0.105	0.120

Models 1-3: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.

$BRT\%_j$ = Proportion of degree-granting institutions with bias response teams in state *j*/number of institutions in state *j*, expressed in percent

$R\ Pres_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in university *i*'s state (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals Trump's share of the Republican + Democratic vote in Tennessee), expressed in percent

$R\ Senate_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

$R\ House_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

Table 5S: Regression Analysis

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Guber_j + ß_1 * R\ State\ Senate_j + ß_2 * R\ State\ House_j + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Constant	4.58 (0.94)	11.00 (2.81)**	10.79 (2.79)**
R Guber	0.126 (1.73)		
R State Senate	-0.154 (-1.56)	0.000 (0.00)	
R State House	-0.038 (0.48)	-0.118 (-1.19)	-0.115 (-1.76)**
Observations	12	42	43
Adj. R-Square	-0.18	0.07	0.09

Models 1-3: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.

$BRT\%_j$ = Proportion of degree-granting institutions with bias response teams in state *j*/number of institutions in state *j*, expressed in percent

R Guber$_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

R State Senate$_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

R State House$_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in university *i*'s state, expressed in percent

Table 5NC: Regression Analysis

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + \beta_0 * R\ Pres_j + \beta_1 * R\ Senate_j + \beta_2 * R\ House_j + \beta_3 * NCSC_j + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Constant	5.38 (2.28)**	9.53 (3.95)**	8.80 (4.70)**
R Pres	0.104 (1.38)	-0.037 (-0.64)	
R Senate	-0.043 (-0.90)		
R House	-0.085 (-2.51)**	-0.062 (-1.60)	-0.085 (-2.83)**
NCSC	2.95 (3.27)**	2.80 (3.61)**	2.82 (3.55)**
Observations	34	50	50
Adj. R-Square	0.028	0.111	0.127

Models 1-3: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.

$BRT\%_j$ = Proportion of degree-granting institutions with bias response teams in state *j*/number of institutions in state *j*, expressed in percent

$R\ Pres_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Donald J. Trump in Tennessee), expressed in percent

$R\ Senate_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in the university's state, expressed in percent

$R\ House_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in the university's state, expressed in percent

$NCSC_j$: Equals 1 if institution i is in either North Carolina or South Carolina; else 0

Table 5SC: Regression Analysis

$$BRT\%_j = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Guber_j + ß_1 * R\ State\ Senate_j + ß_2 * R\ State\ House_j + ß_3 * NCSC_j + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Constant	4.01 (0.82)	11.24 (2.86)**	11.04 (2.84)**
R Guber	0.129 (1.86)		
R State Senate	-0.138 (-1.56)	-0.004 (-0.05)	
R State House	0.026 (0.33)	-0.121 (-1.20)	-0.122 (-1.85)*
NCSC	2.93 (3.66)**	3.07 (4.35)**	3.11 (4.28)**
Observations	12	42	43
Adj. R-Square	-0.251	0.075	0.095

Models 1-3: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Note that the value of 1.86 in model 1 is insignificant at the 10% level because of the small sample size.

$BRT\%_j$ = Proportion of degree-granting institutions with bias response teams in state *j*/number of institutions in state *j*, expressed in percent

$R\ Guber_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the gubernatorial election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for Indiana University, this equals the share of Republican + Democratic vote cast for Eric J. Holcomb in Indiana), expressed in percent

$R\ State\ Senate_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the State-Senate election, if any, in the university's state, expressed in percent

$R\ State\ House_j$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all State-House elections in the university's state, expressed in percent

$NCSC_j$: Equals 1 if institution *i* is in either North Carolina or South Carolina; else 0

Table 6N: Logit Regression Analysis

$$BRT_i = \alpha + ß_0 * R\ Pres_i + ß_1 * R\ Senate_i + ß_2 * R\ House_i + ß_3 * Private + ß_4 * R\ Local_i + \varepsilon i \quad (3)$$

	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7
Constant	0.820 (0.565)	1.783 (0.091)*	1.80 (0.045)**	1.72 (0.053)*
R Pres	0.050 (0.506)	0.001 (0.979)		
R Senate	0.009 (0.724)			
R House	-0.069 (0.244)	-0.041 (0.319)	-0.040 (0.029)**	-0.031 (0.048)**
Private	0.099 (0.880)	0.008 (0.988)		
R Local	-0.000 (0.961)	0.008 (0.331)	0.008 (0.329)	
Observations	93	130	130	130
Pr>Chi-Square For Regression	0.812	0.272	0.076*	0.041**

Models 4-7: p-values of chi-square tests for significance in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.

BRT_i = 1 if institution i has a BRT and 0 otherwise

$R\ Pres_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the presidential election in the university's state, expressed in percent (for example, for the University of Tennessee, this equals the share of the Republican + Democratic vote cast for Donald J. Trump in Tennessee), expressed in percent

$R\ Senate_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for the Senate election, if any, in the university's state, expressed in percent

$R\ House_i$: Republican share/(Republican share + Democratic share) for all House elections in the university's state, expressed in percent

$Private_j$: = 1 if institution i is private and 0 if public

$R\ Local_i$ = Republican share of vote in the congressional district of institution i, expressed in percent