Division and polarization on college and university campuses seems to be increasing, while support for free speech and intellectual diversity seems to be weakening. I suggest that a cause of both might be a lack of consensus about what the purpose of higher education is and what the professional responsibilities of professors are. I argue that academics should embrace a professional identity that is informed by and dedicated to an open-ended process of inquiry that has characterized our intellectual tradition since the time of ancient Greece, and not by allegiance to particular political positions or outcomes.

**KEYWORDS:**
free speech, intellectual diversity, academic professionalism

**I. INTRODUCTION**

My topic in this essay is the importance of intellectual diversity on college and university campuses. I suspect, however, that almost all academics already believe in the importance of intellectual diversity on campus. So how might I add to the conversation? I propose to approach the topic somewhat indirectly, by discussing a related notion: academic professionalism.

First, however, some context. I write as a professor.
I do not write as a politician, nor as an advocate of my personal political views. I have personal political views, of course, but I believe they should be irrelevant to my professional work as an academic. Indeed, my main thesis is that there is such a thing as a professional academic, and that one central aspect of the crisis we seem to be facing in higher education arises ultimately from a failure to appreciate what it means to be a professional academic and a failure to respect what follows from that. I believe that too many academics today have lost sight of the fact that we are professionals and that we should accordingly act professionally.

When internal problems arise in any organization, often they are related to a confusion or a disagreement about what the purpose and mission of the organization are, or a failure to embrace them. A successful organization is one that starts with a clear conception of its purpose, and an embracing by all of its members of this purpose and the mission it entails. Given that, perhaps the first question we should address regarding higher education is: what is the purpose of higher education? One often hears that its purpose is the “pursuit of truth,” or perhaps the “unfettered pursuit of truth.” I agree, but I believe the emphasis should be on the word pursuit rather than on the word truth. About so many things, it is hard to know when, or even whether, we have hit upon truth; and there can be a danger to focusing on truth, because it is when people believe they are already in possession of the truth that they can become inclined to stop searching, inquiring, and examining. I propose, therefore, that we reframe the mission of academia by conceiving of the purpose of higher education as twofold: first, to transmit the central findings and the central elements of the “great conversation” that has characterized our tradition of learning since at least the time of Socrates; and second, to respect and preserve the millennia-long profession of inquiry that has enabled us to reach the astounding intellectual heights we have achieved.

Academia is a profession, like law, medicine, or business. Accordingly, academics ought to have a professional identity and a code of professional ethics that specifies our professional responsibilities. Academics in fact have a dual professional responsibility. The first is to master our fields, including the history and primary achievements of those fields, and, to the best of our abilities, to convey those achievements, including our own contributions to them, to each new generation of students. The second responsibility, however, is to the tradition of inquiry itself, and to stewarding the noble profession of academia. So our obligations are both to substance and to process: what have the greatest in our fields believed, professed, and demonstrated; and what is the process or method they have developed that has proved most successful and is likeliest to lead to yet further achievements of knowledge? It is not that we should not be advocates; what matters here is, rather, the content and purpose of what we should advocate. We should advocate on behalf of a peculiar, and relatively recent, effort to use one particular aspect of our cognitive toolkit to characterize and understand the world.

II. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Let me illustrate by using my own field as an example. My field is philosophy. When and where did philosophy begin? We standardly identify the beginnings of Western philosophy and science with

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1. As Williams (2017, p. 3) explains, three breweries in particular responsible for the current boom in Charlotte are Olde Mecklenburg Brewery (OMB), NoDa Brewing Company (NoDa), and Birdsong Brewery.
the Ionian city-state of Miletus, which was on the western coast of what is now Turkey, in the sixth century BC. The hallmark of what these Milesian thinkers did was what we today might call critical reasoning: formulating, proposing, and examining hypotheses. The method they began to develop and use is what has enabled the spectacular growth in human knowledge and understanding we have seen in the subsequent two and a half millennia.

The first writings that have content we might now call philosophical, or perhaps scientific, were cosmogonies, or accounts of how our ordered world (or cosmos) came into existence, and cosmologies, or accounts of what the fundamental elements of the universe are. Before the Milesians, there were creation stories that offered metaphysical and poetical accounts of the “birth” of the universe. For example, the Babylonian epic poem Enuma Elish, which is thought to date from approximately 1700 BC, describes material elements—fresh water, salt water, clouds—giving birth to the world and to the gods, and then the gods giving rise to human beings. And the Judaic account in Genesis, which was finalized between the sixth and fifth centuries BC but dates perhaps from the twelfth or eleventh century BC, describes a separate and distinct entity, Yahweh, simply willing the world, including human beings, into existence. In these two early accounts we see several characteristic elements that distinguish them from what I am calling philosophical accounts. First, they were anthropomorphic, describing nonhuman processes or events in terms of human processes or events. For example, the elements give birth to the gods, or the seasons have emotions such as love and hate. Second, they employed inscrutable means to explain events. For example, Yahweh has only to will, and the world comes into being. Third, they were based on mere assertion and aimed at mere acceptance. They typically did not invite debate, testing, or experiment.

By contrast, the Milesians of the sixth century BC proposed hypotheses that were also meant to explain the origin and nature of the universe but that took the extraordinary step of being open to verification or falsification. For example, Thales (c. 624–546 BC) first proposed that the universe was made out of hydor, or water, meaning he thought the single fundamental element of everything that exists is water. But Thales’s younger associate Anaximander (c. 610–546 BC) thought there were problems with this proposal: water has only one nature, while there seem to be things of different natures in the world; and how could fire, the opposite of water, nevertheless also come from water? So Anaximander offered a proposal of his own—apeiron, or the boundless—as the fundamental element, whose open-ended nature was meant to correct the problems he saw with Thales’s proposal. But Anaximander’s own younger associate Anaximenes (c. 585–528 BC) thought there was a problem with Anaximander’s proposal—namely, it was too indefinite to give rise to things with specific natures. So he sought a middle ground between Thales’s too definite water and Anaximander’s overly vague boundless; he proposed aer, or air, as the fundamental element, which Anaximenes thought could rarify or condense to create less- and more-solid substances.

This series of alternative positions illustrates what separates nonphilosophical accounts from philosophical—or, as we might put it, nonscientific accounts from scientific. The difference is not in the particular things the Milesians believed, but in their method. That method included, first and foremost, looking for reasons for beliefs, and accepting logical and empirical verification and falsification as criteria for holding or abandoning beliefs. Second,

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2. The distinction between science and other areas of human inquiry did not come into use until the nineteenth century.
their method was based on an assumption of logos, or reason, as not only the ruling principle of the cosmos but also humanity’s chief tool in understanding it.

It is these characteristics that set the Milesians apart from other thinkers and justify our considering them as among the first philosophers or scientists. They are also what help us distinguish between science and pseudoscience today: A set of beliefs that relies on anthropomorphism, metaphor, or uncritical acceptance is, however important or valuable it might otherwise be, probably not a science. On the other hand, a set of beliefs that instead offers reasons for beliefs, seeks literal (not metaphorical) explanations for events, tries to discover causal mechanisms, and can be falsified by logical analysis or by empirically observed data, might be a science and its results might constitute knowledge. The heights to which our knowledge and understanding have reached in the subsequent millennia, which have enabled everything from antibiotics to space travel to the internet, are ultimately owing to this method of open inquiry and rational criticism employed by these ancient Greek thinkers.

III. ACADEMIC INQUIRY

How does this relate to intellectual diversity? My suggestion is that, as professional academics, we should recognize the achievements of this method of learning that has constituted the essence of our profession since its beginnings, and we should respect and protect its tradition. We should respect the norms, the conventions, and the methods that have allowed us to come to tentative understandings of the world that, however through a glass darkly we see, we can dare to hope might ever more closely approximate the truth.

The nature of this method of inquiry implies we can never be assured we have the final word. This is true even in the so-called hard sciences, whose history is full of revolutions and fundamental changes in belief. It is also true in the so-called soft sciences of sociology, psychology, and economics, in which the more we learn, the more we realize there is still so much more we do not know. And it is all the more true in fields such as politics and morality, in which not only is there more variation in sincerely held belief but in which our biases and tribalisms often color our judgments. I suggest that in our professional capacity as academics, instead of believing we already know all there is to know or all we will need to know, we should repair instead to the tradition of inquiry itself—to draw on and extend its tools, and to apply them to new areas and in new ways to those already covered, as we seek to understand the world and our place in it.

Respecting this tradition of inquiry is, then, an indispensable duty for us as professional academics. We deal in thoughts and ideas, in hypotheses and conjectures, in proposals and arguments, in criticism and counterargument. If a hypothesis or proposal is false or wrongheaded, our fiduciary professional responsibility is hence to demonstrate that by the process of falsification and refutation that is itself the core characteristic of our profession. That is the true lesson from our tradition of higher learning. It is what has separated it from other activities and what separates science from pseudoscience, knowledge from opinion, intellectual progress from dogmatism, and the professional academic from the sophist. Here, as in so much else, Socrates is our intellectual lodestar. As Socrates argued, the goal is not merely to win an argument. That is the goal of the sophist, not the philosopher—that is, of the person who seeks to seem intelligent rather than the person who seeks genuine wisdom. Our goal is to strive to separate what might be true from what might be false so that we can embrace the former and discard the latter.
The moment any of us begins to feel the pull of wanting “our side” to win, however, or of disinclination to hear criticism and weigh it dispassionately, we are hearing the siren song of sophistry. That is the danger that, because we human beings are partial and biased and fallible and tribal, is ever present—and it comes roaring to the fore particularly in politics. Here is a litmus test. If we feel an emotional investment in an idea, if we find ourselves growing angry at others who disagree with us, indeed if we feel emotions arising in any way, beware: our judgment may be clouded, and our rational faculties, which are cool and even boring, may be overwhelmed and crowded out by the hot rush of emotions. It is thrilling to vanquish an enemy, even an intellectual enemy; but that thrill is the result not of impassive investigation but of emotional release. As weak and limited and uncertain as our rational capacities are, our emotional responses are often even less reliable indicators of truth, especially concerning complex reality.

Because politics in particular is so fraught with emotional content and tribal loyalties, it therefore poses a serious risk in the context of higher education. It can cloud our judgment, and it can replace a loyalty to the process of inquiry with a loyalty to one’s tribe. We can come to judge arguments, hypotheses, and even people not on the merits of their arguments and evidence, but instead on the extent to which they conform to our prejudices or our group identities. For that reason, it imperils our professional identities as academics if we allow politics to enter into our scholarship. Our work may have political implications, and in some of our disciplines the study of political processes might inform our work; the danger lies in becoming committed to a specific political outcome rather than to the process of inquiry itself. Of course we might have political allegiances in our capacity as citizens, just as we might rightly have special loyalties as parents or children or siblings or spouses or friends. But as academics, as professionals, and in our professional capacities, our loyalty should be to the process of inquiry itself.

IV. PARTISAN ADVOCACY IN ACADEMIA

What are some practical implications of my argument? In the academy, it means we should have no departments or units or centers or institutes whose primary purpose is to inform, affect, or advocate on behalf of specific public policies. We should have no fixed or official political positions supporting or opposing particular political parties, candidates, or policies; we should take no official institutional stances on contested or controversial political issues; and there should be no claims that are not open to questioning and debate. We can report our findings, especially if we work in fields connected with politics: here is what my research indicates are the likely consequences of imposing tariffs; here is how my research shows these chemicals affect coral reefs; here is my professional judgment of Grover Cleveland’s presidency. All that is entirely unobjectionable and indeed greatly valuable. Yet when it comes to taking substantive positions on political issues, we must leave politics to the political process itself. We should render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and jealously guard what is ours—namely, the tradition of open inquiry that informs our purpose, mission, and activities.

Everything we do, then, should be in the service of this high purpose: everything from the classes we teach to what we publish to what we ask of students. For individual academics, we can have our political obligations—perhaps we are members of a political party, for example, or support particular political advocacy groups or causes—but these must be personal and not professional. Their substance should be strictly irrelevant to what we do as professional academics. So if some
of our colleagues want the academy to advocate substantive political positions, we should respond, “No, that is not our job.” When our universities are asked to take stances on DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), on raising the minimum wage, on Donald Trump’s presidency, on boycotts and divestments: “No, that is not our job.” If professors want to advocate positions on issues such as these in the classroom: “No, that is not our job.” We do not choose or evaluate our doctors on their political stances, but on their mastery of medicine; we do not choose or evaluate our plumbers on their political stances, but on their mastery of plumbing. They might have political stances, and their stances might be similar to or different from our own, but either way, that is irrelevant to their professional work. The same is, or should be, true of academics.

This is not a matter of academic freedom: there should be no limits placed on what we may investigate, question, or examine. But our work must be in the service of our profession, must be consistent with the norms of that profession, and must be informed by the mission of that profession. It is therefore not the substance of one’s position that might be objectionable; it is, rather, the move from dispassionate inquiry to partisan advocacy that is a departure from, even a betrayal of, higher education’s mission. It is a breach of academic professionalism, and it risks endangering the precious tradition of higher learning itself.

V. PARTISAN ADVOCACY AND WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

Two concrete examples will illustrate my argument. First, a local political advocacy group described my invitation to the James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal as the invitation of a “conservative” professor who would come, apparently, to advocate conservatism. The fact that I am labeled as a conservative by people who have never read any of my published work or been in any of my classrooms is odd. On what grounds could they possibly characterize my personal political views? Not because of their substance: that group has not engaged my substantive positions. Perhaps it is instead because I have not accepted the growing contemporary expectation of publicly professing specific political positions, which in higher education today predominantly does not consider itself conservative. If I will not publicly and in my professional capacity advocate against political conservatism, then I must be a conservative; and no more thought is required to dismiss me or my work by those for whom advocacy against conservatism is a prime directive. In that case, one does not need to read my books or my published articles, because one already knows all one needs to know.

But the actual position I take is advocacy for the profession of learning. My goal is to respect both aspects of my professional obligations as an academic: I strive to master my discipline and convey its central elements to students without regard for how this might line up with others’, or even my own, personal political positions; and I strive to respect the profession of academia by not abiding attempts to bend its great and noble traditions to any partisan ends.

My stance has sometimes made me a target in my career. Here is a second example. In May 2016, Wake Forest University launched a new initiative, the Eudaimonia Institute, whose mission was to create an interdisciplinary intellectual community to investigate the nature of genuine human happiness—or flourishing, what Aristotle’s word eudaimonia means—and to investigate the public social institutions that seem to support eudaimonic lives. Wake Forest’s administration asked me to be the

institute’s founding executive director, an invitation I happily accepted, since the institute’s mission is not only at the core of Wake Forest’s “Pro Humanitate” educational mission but also at the heart of my own scholarly work. So far, so good. But then the university decided to accept a donation to the institute from the Charles Koch Foundation.

We had formed a faculty advisory board of over a dozen tenured faculty from different disciplines who would oversee the institute’s activities, and we even wrote what we called a “Declaration of Research Independence,” which publicly stated our commitment to independent judgment and free inquiry, not subject to limitations or conclusions that donors or others might wish to apply to, or demand from, us. We publicly declared ourselves “nonpartisan and nonideological.” We would pursue lines of inquiry and thought that we alone, in our independent professional academic judgment, believed worthy, and our tentative conclusions would be only those we thought our investigations warranted on their merits.

But, for some of my colleagues, taking money from the Koch Foundation was beyond the pale. For the Kochs have political views, and those political views are not shared by many of my colleagues. So when it was announced that Wake Forest had accepted a gift from the Koch Foundation, a petition signed by some 180 of my colleagues (or about one-quarter of Wake Forest’s faculty) demanded an investigation into this gift; not one but two ad hoc faculty committees were then convened to investigate how this could have happened and the dangers it might pose; and, after months of meetings and discussions and inquiries, these committees issued long reports condemning the Eudaimonia Institute, Wake Forest University, and me personally.

We were criticized for not making the gift agreement public. But, as a private university, Wake Forest has a longstanding policy not to make any of its gift agreements public; and, of course, the agreement was vetted by deans, the provost, university advancement (the office of fundraising and development), the general counsel of the university, and the university president, and was signed by the president. We were condemned for accepting money from a donor with a publicly stated agenda, though Wake Forest has accepted gifts without incident or complaint from hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other donors who have public agendas. And then one of my courses, which had been approved by standard procedures in the School of Business and overwhelmingly made, by a business-school-wide faculty vote, a new prerequisite for students to major in business (but the course was open to all students), was declared invalid, stripped of its ability to count for credit for any students who did not major in business, and thus removed as a recognized prerequisite. The ad hoc faculty committees demanded rejection of our funding and severing all ties to the “Koch network” (not just the Koch Foundation), and one of the committees went so far as to suggest that all faculty associated with the Eudaimonia Institute be prohibited from speaking, lecturing, or publishing without prior approval from a newly appointed faculty committee. One of the committees also questioned—publicly, and in print—whether I was in fact qualified to hold my academic position at Wake Forest.

In open faculty forums, the Kochs were

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4. “Pro Humanitate,” or “in the service of humankind,” is Wake Forest University’s motto.
6. It is also the case that Wake Forest thrives in part because of generous gifts from families in the tobacco industry.
7. In one of life’s small ironies, my course was subsequently awarded an Aspen Institute 2017 “Ideas Worth Teaching” national award. See Aspen Institute (2017).
8. “Motion 2: To freeze current hiring by the Eudaimonia Institute, and cancel any internal (e.g., Eudaimonia Conference) or external presentations related to the IE [sic], and to restrict publication of material from EI until the [newly proposed] COI [Conflict of Interest] committee is established and the University COI policy can be applied” (Crainshaw et al. 2017, p. 12).
condemned for having an agenda, for taking the wrong positions on climate change and other substantive issues, for using the concept of well-being as a pleasant-sounding mask to hide their true motive of insinuating free market ideas into the academy, and so on.10 The Eudaimonia Institute was condemned as a “Trojan horse” that required quarantine, “fencing in,” and extraordinary oversight. I was portrayed as a corporate stooge or as trying to dupe my colleagues or students; as somehow having a conflict of interest; and as enforcing, or proposing to enforce, an ideological litmus test.

In the fall of 2016, one of my colleagues, a professor of religion—a person I had never met and had never spoken to—stood up in a public faculty meeting and gave a lengthy speech denouncing the Kochs and questioning my personal integrity. There then ensued months of investigations and committee meetings and letters and op-eds condemning me and us and our efforts.11 Over this time, I had many colleagues contact me privately to express both sympathy and support. They have used terms such as “witch hunt” and “McCarthyism” to describe the petitions and ad hoc investigatory committees and white papers and reports; and they have said they were embarrassed by and ashamed of the religion professor’s speech attacking me. Yet the majority of the supportive colleagues who contacted me have done so privately, and are hesitant to speak out publicly, out of the reasonable fear that they themselves might become the targets of the next investigation.12

VI. THE UNDERMINING OF INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY

I am of course not alone in facing these kinds of rather ungenerous attacks, and indeed it seems the levels of recrimination and vituperation have been increasing on college campuses around the country. I have dwelled on my own recent experience because I think it is illustrative and, unfortunately, increasingly common. Similar examples at other colleges and universities are abundant and easy to find. I believe that experiences such as this stem at least in part from a failure to understand what colleges and universities are, and what they are not. If we were seminaries, or if we were political parties, then a demand that all of our members profess, or confess, certain substantive commitments or beliefs, or a demand for ideological purity and loyalty, might be entirely appropriate. But we are not a seminary and we are not a political party: we are a university. Academics are not politicians or priests: we are professors.

If there is any place on earth where all positions are, or should be, open to questioning, where we judge arguments on their merits and not on whether they comport with a prior roster of approved commitments, it is a university. If there

9. In an undated (though received in October 2017) letter to Wake Forest University president Nathan Hatch, the authors claim to have received secondhand confidential personnel information from an unnamed source alleging “irregularities in the hiring and tenure process of Professor Otteson.” They go on to state: “Although these facts certainly raised concerns, the Ad Hoc Committee chose to leave these details out of its final report” (p. 6)—though they chose not to leave it out of their letter to the university president, which they then proceeded to publish on Wake Forest University’s public Faculty Senate webpage. They later took it down, after I asked them to remove their unsubstantiated “defamatory and potentially libelous” secondhand rumors; but of course by then it had already been made public. See Albrecht et al. (2017).

10. See Barbour et al. (2016).

11. This has now gone on for two years, and counting. In April 2018, a third convened faculty committee—on which the religion professor, among others, served—submitted its own lengthy report recommending the creation of a new faculty committee, made up of fully twelve elected faculty members, whose job would be to review all university centers and institutes, as well as their directors. The report recommended, moreover, that this new committee be granted the power to initiate a full review of any center or institute at any time and for any reason, and that any such review could potentially result in termination of the center or institute, with no provision for appeal or reconsideration. See Raynor et al. (2018). The Faculty Senate approved this committee’s recommendations at its April 18, 2018, meeting.

12. I note also that this controversy has gained Wake Forest national notoriety; see, for example, Riley (2017). I have also been informed that the controversy has cost Wake Forest over $20 million in lost or rescinded donations from donors concerned over what they perceive is an intolerant atmosphere at the university.
is any place where we allow and even encourage open inquiry, where we not only allow but encourage exploration of unusual or novel or even controversial hypotheses, and where we allow and encourage challenge from minority viewpoints, it is a university. If there is any place where we engage ideas and not the persons holding them, where we recognize that the ad hominem fallacy is indeed a fallacy, it is, or should be, a university. Socrates said the “unexamined life is not worth living.” That expresses the purpose of the academy, and that is its mission.

Of course, the difficulty with this conception of a university is that it means there will be disagreement, and people often do not like disagreement. (Socrates was put to death, after all.) There will be diverse and competing ideas about philosophy, history, politics, morality, religion, and culture, and sometimes those ideas will clash. But this is not something to be feared; it is to be celebrated. It does not undermine the mission of a university: it exemplifies it, if our mission is understood as one characterized by inquiry and investigation, rather than as conformity to a specific set of beliefs. Since people are different, they will, if allowed, come to differing conclusions, they will be interested to investigate different questions, they will want to teach and write about different texts and ideas, and they will understand the human condition and the arc of human history differently.

Allowing and even encouraging that diversity is not only what generates intellectual vitality and enables a vigorous life of the mind, but it is also the way we respect what it means to be professional academics. It is the way we show respect to one another as colleagues and scholars, as good-faith agents of intellectual inquiry, and as professionals. Our intellectual tradition is capacious and strong enough to encompass a wide range of competing views, and our colleges and universities are, or at least ought to be, robust enough to allow multiple and even conflicting perspectives. And students in our universities are capable of hearing multiple ideas and determining their own paths forward. If professors filter out all but a preferred set of ideas, then not only do they betray their solemn duty as academics, but they encourage those discerning abilities in our students, and our society, to atrophy.

As we continue, then, in these contentious times, to examine the nature and purpose of higher education—and I believe we should continue to do so—it is paramount that we repair to first principles. What are we for? What is our purpose? What is our mission? As I have argued, I believe our purpose is to engage in inquiry, and thus our mission is to accept the professional obligations that entails by resolutely reminding ourselves we do not constitute a political entity. My personal politics do not determine my abilities as a professional academic, and I should not judge others in my profession—neither my colleagues nor my students—on the basis of their personal commitments. That means that the only investigations in which we should engage are into ideas and hypotheses, not into one another’s personal politics; the only speculations we should make are about how to understand the world, not about one another’s secret motives. And we should not seek to intimidate or persecute people to bring about conformity or silence, but on the contrary inform those who seek to do so that such activity is not compatible with our longstanding, even sacred, institutional mission.

In other words, we should do our rightful work as professional academics. We are contenders in the arena of ideas, and we should leave to other arenas the fights for power, politics, and partisanship. In accepting the life of the gown, we professors have voluntarily entered into the high and noble tradition of open inquiry and thus we
have incurred a professional obligation to preserve and protect its mission. Today we find our tradition assailed on many sides, as it has been repeatedly throughout its history, going all the way back to ancient Greece. If it is to endure, we must resist those assaults, and we must begin by not letting our tradition be undermined from within.

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